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KREMZOW V. REPUBLIK OSTERREICH: A CASE
FOR EXCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES FROM
THE JURISDICTION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF JUSTICE
ERIN MCALPIN EISELEIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1997, the Austrian Supreme Court asked the European Court of
Justice (ECJ)l for a preliminary ruling in the case of Kremzow v. Repub-
lik Osterreich (Austrian State)2 to determine what effect a decision by
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has upon a Member
State.3 After a brief analysis relying entirely on five prior ECJ opin-
ions,4 the ECJ held that it lacked the jurisdiction to offer interpretive
guidance since the matter was not grounded in community law.5
The ECJ opinion in Kremzow exemplifies a fundamental problem of
Europe as a united body. There is a lack of clear definition regarding
the scope of authority between the various European supranational
bodies. Specifically, between the European Union (EU or Union)6 and
J.D. Candidate, May 2000, University of Denver College of Law.
1. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the primary judicial branch of the Euro-
pean Union. T.C. HARLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 52 (4TH ed.
1998). The Treaty of Rome created the ECJ in Articles 164-88. TREATY OF ROME, Mar.
25, 1957, [1957] 298 U.N.T.S. 11 arts. 164-88 (1957) [hereinafter EEC TREATY]. The ECJ
is discussed in detail infra, notes 134-174 and accompanying text.
2. Case C-299/95, Kremzow v. Republik Osterreich, 3 C.M.L.R. 1289 (1997).
3. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2642-43, 12(1).
4. See generally Opinion 2/94, RE the Accession by the Community to the European
Human Rights Convention, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 265 (1996); Case
260/89, Elliniki Radiofonia Tileorassi Anonimi Etairia (ERT AE) and Another v. Dimotiki
Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Another, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2925; Case 159/90,
Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. (SPUC) v. Steven Grogan and
Others, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4685, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849 (1991); Case 180/83, Hans Moser v.
Land Baden-Wurttemberg, 1984 E.C.R. 2539, [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 720 (1984); Case C-
144/95, Criminal Proceedings Against Jean-Louis Maurin, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2909.
5. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2646, 1 19.
6. On February 7, 1992, the Treaty on European Union (also called the Maastricht
Treaty) was signed in Maastricht. Previously, the bodies that were independently called
the European Economic Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the
European Atomic Energy Community, collectively became the "European Union." TREATY
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the Council of the Europe;7 and, between the various bodies and their
respective Member States. Over the last fifty years, Europe has created
the most sophisticated system of international community institutions,
yet many structural questions remain unanswered and produce contin-
ual confusion among the Member States. 8 The ECJ is a critical channel
established by the European Union to clarify and develop issues sur-
rounding the relationship between the various European bodies and
their respective Member States.9 Ideally, the jurisprudence of the ECJ
should guide both the Union and the Member States toward an in-
ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R 719, 31
I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter TEU] amending TREATY OF ROME, Mar. 25, 1957, [1957], 298
U.N.T.S. 11 (1957), as amended by Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 741. It is important to note that the European Community and the European
Union are two separate bodies. The European Community (formerly the European Eco-
nomic Community) is only one of the bodies incorporated into the larger European Union.
See JAMES D. DINNAGE & JOHN F. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION 3 (1996) (clarifying the distinctions between the various European bodies since the
1993 Treaty of European Union). Although, in the Kremzow opinion, the ECJ refers to
this group of 15 Member States as the "European Community," this case note will refer to
this group as the "European Union," to reflect the Maastricht change. However, the
"European Community" will be used when analyzing the ECJ's opinions. See also
WALTER CAIRNS INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW 2 (1997). The 15 Member
States of the European Union are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
209 (1995).
7. The Council of Europe was established in 1949 as a post-World War II body, cre-
ated "for the purposes of achieving co-operation in the cultural, political, legal and social
fields." CARINS, supra note 6, at 12. The Council gained rapid acceptance from many na-
tions, based in large part upon a collective guilt for failing to prevent Nazism and Fascism
during World War II. Peter Leuprecht, Innovations in the European System of Human
Rights Protection: is Enlargement Compatible with Reinforcement?, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 313, 313 (1998). As of March 1, 1999, the 40 Member States of the
Council of Europe are: Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Nether-
lands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Slovak Republic, Slove-
nia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey,
Ukraine, and United Kingdom. The Council of Europe Homepage (visited Feb. 28, 1999)
<http://www.coe.fr/englegaltxt/esignpays.htm>. See also Andrew Drzemczewski, The
European Human Rights Convention: A New Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg as of
November 1, 1998, 55 WASH & LEE L. REV. 697 (1998) (listing the 40 Member States of
the Council of Europe). In six years, the Council of Europe has grown from 23 members
to 40 members. There are also five additional states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bos-
nia-Herzegovina and Georgia) with special guest status who have applied for full mem-
bership. NATO: The Council of Europe, M2 Presswire, Jan. 8, 1997, WL 8023394, at *4-5.
See also Leuprecht, supra note 7, at 326 ("The Council's role is no longer limited to the
defense of pluralist democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Its new task is to play
an active role in 'democracy-building' in the post-communist countries').
8. See A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 8, 156
(1996).
9. See EEC TREATY, supra note 1, arts. 164-88.
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creased understanding of Union law and its relationship with Member
State law. However, the continual pressure on the ECJ to broaden the
scope of its authority to include other issues such as human rights, de-
tracts from its ability to perform its essential function of developing
Union law.
The ECJ struggled with how to further define the scope of Union
law when it decided Kremzow v. Republic Osterreich.o Kremzow pres-
sured the ECJ to extend its jurisdiction to include human rights protec-
tion." After an initial reading of the opinion, it may appear that the
Court placed human rights in a secondary position when it declined to
address Austria's preliminary rulings based upon procedural grounds. 12
In actuality, the court declined to extend its jurisdiction to include hu-
man rights because, if extended, its jurisdiction would then signifi-
cantly overlap with the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR). 13 This case note argues that if the ECJ is to remain a
successful and legitimate judicial body, it must continue to limit the
scope of its authority to issues relating exclusively to the European
Union.
The first section of this casenote will offer a detailed examination of
the Court's opinion in Kremzow v. Republick Osterreich. The factual
10. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2646, 19 ("when national legislation is concerned
with a situation which ... does not fall within the field of application of community law,
the Court cannot ... give the interpretive guidance [requested]").
11. See id. at 2642-43, 1 12.
12. See id. at 2646, 19.
13. The European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR") was created by Articles 38-56 of
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms. European Convention, Nov. 4, 1950, [1950] 312 U.N.T.S. 221, (1950) [hereinafter
European Convention]. The European Convention emerged in post World War II Europe
and was founded upon a strong desire to protect human rights and preserve these rights
against the newly emerged Soviet Bloc. ROBERTSON & MERRILLS, supra note 8, at 120.
The preamble to the European Convention explains that the goal of the European Con-
vention:
is the achievement of greater unity between its Members and ....
[re]affirming their profound belief in those Fundamental Freedoms
which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best
maintained on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on
the other by a common understanding and observance of the Human
Rights upon which they depend....
European Convention, at preamble. The European Convention has grown into what has
been called "the strongest and most effective human rights treaty there is today." Le-
uprecht, supra note 7, at 316. In 1998, the Member States of the Council of Europe rati-
fied Protocol No. 11 to the European Convention, streamlining the part-time institutions
that had previously monitored human rights in Europe, into a full-time European Court
of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France. Drzemczewski, supra note 7, at 697. For further
information on Protocol No. 11, see id. (offering a detailed description of the Strasbourg
reform). For a detailed description of the process of filing a complaint with the ECHR, see
generally LUKE CLEMENTS, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: TAKING A CASE UNDER THE
CONVENTION (1994).
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background and procedural posture of the case will be discussed to pro-
vide a framework for the ECJ's opinion. The second section will conduct
an inquiry of the Court's analysis and a detailed discussion of each of
the five cases the Court relied upon in reaching its decision. The third
section will argue that European human rights are sufficiently pro-
tected through a number of other European and international institu-
tions. Further, the ECJ must confine the scope of its authority to issues
exclusively relating to Union law if it is to remain a successful and le-
gitimate judicial body. While the complex issue of the inter-
relationships between the European courts is continually debated, the
coming of the millennium begs clarity of this situation in order for
Europe to move forward as a united body.
II. FACTS
The following section will provide the factual background of
Kremzow v. Republik Osterreich and a discussion of how Kremzow
reached the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Friedrich Kremzow, an
Austrian man, worked in Vienna as a legal consultant after retiring
from the Austrian judiciary.' 4 On December 16, 1982, Kremzow con-
fessed to murdering one of his clients, Mr. p.,15 a confession he promptly
retracted.16 Two years later, the Court of Assizes (Geschworenen-
gericht) at the District Court (Kreisgericht) found Kremzow guilty of
murder and unlawful possession of a firearm. 17 Kremzow received the
maximum sentence under Austrian law:18 twenty years in an institu-
tion for the mentally ill. 19
Kremzow appealed to the Austrian Supreme Court (Oberster
Gerichtsho) by filing a plea of nullity (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde).20 The
plea was partially supported by the fact that he was denied the right to
represent himself.2' He also filed an appeal against the sentence
(Berufung), asking for a reduction in his sentence. 22 The Supreme
Court rejected Kremzow's plea of nullity and affirmed his guilty ver-
dict.23 Additionally, the Supreme Court modified his sentence and or-
dered him to serve life in an ordinary prison rather than twenty years
14. See Kremzow v. Austria, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 322, 8 (1993).
15. See id.
16. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2640, 1 3.
17. See id. at 2640, 1 4.
18. See Kremzow, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep., 11.
19. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2640, 4.
20. See Kremzow, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 12.
21. Id.
22. See Kremzow, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep., 12.
23. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2640, 5.
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in a mental institution.24 The Supreme Court also rejected supplemen-
tary pleas of nullity brought by Kremzow's wife and mother. 25
Kremzow did not request to attend the appellate proceedings, nor
was his presence requested by the Supreme Court.26 This fact resulted
in the referral of his case to the ECHR.27 The premise of the referral
was that Kremzow's human rights, under the European Convention for
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention), 28
were violated when he was not allowed to defend himself in person at
the Austrian Supreme Court. 29 On September 21, 1993, the ECHR
unanimously found that Kremzow's absence at the hearing violated his
right to a fair trial under the European Convention, Article 6(1),30 when
taken in conjunction with Article 6(3).31 Article 6(3) provides the right
to defend oneself in person. 32 The ECHR awarded Kremzow costs and
expenses in the amount of 230,000 Austrian schillings, 33 as "just satis-
faction" under Article 50 of the European Convention. 34 Articles 53 and
24. See id. at 2640, 5.
25. See Kremzow, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep., 12, 22.
26. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2640, 5.
27. See id.
28. See generally, European Convention, supra note 13.
29. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2640-41, 1 6.
30. Article 6(1) of the European Convention states:
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any crimi-
nal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal es-
tablished by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press
and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest
of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society,
where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of
the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion
of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice
the interests of justice.
European Convention, supra note 13, art. 6(1). While Article 6 of the European Conven-
tion guarantees the right to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time, it is vio-
lated more often than all other articles combined. Henricus G. Schermers, International
Human Rights in the European Community and in the Nations of Central and Eastern
Europe: An Overview, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 313, 315 (1993). For an interesting discussion of
Article 6, see Annemarieke Beijer et al., Witness Evidence, Article 6 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights and the Principle of Open Justice, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
EUROPE 283 (Phil Fennell et al. eds., 1995) (comparing the different approaches taken by
England and the Netherlands concerning vulnerable witnesses and witnesses outside the
jurisdiction).
31. Article 6(3) of the European Convention provides in relevant part "[elveryone
charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights ... (c) to defend him-
self in person .... European Convention, supra note 13, at art 6(3).
32. See Kremzow v. Austria, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 322, 69 (1993).
33. See id J 10. The currency in Austria is the schilling, which is roughly equivalent
to the German deutsche mark. FEDERAL RESEARCH DIvISION, AUSTRIA, A COUNTRY
STUDY 120 (Eric Solsten & David E. McClave eds. 2d ed. 1994).
34. Article 50 of the European Convention states:
1999
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54 of the European Convention provide the supervision for the enforce-
ment of this judgement. 35
Based on his victory at the ECHR, Kremzow brought two claims
against the Austrian courts in the Regional Civil Court in Vienna
(Zivilrechtssachen Wein).36 Kremzow asked for a reduction in his sen-
tence, in accordance with paragraph 410 of the Austrian Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure, 37 that allows for a reduction of sentence when mitigating
circumstances emerge. 38 Additionally, he requested damages in the
amount of 3,969,058 Austrian schillings for unlawful detention 39 during
the time period of July 3, 1986 through September 30, 1993, as allowed
by Article 5(5) of the European Convention. 40 The Regional Civil Court
If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal author-
ity or any other authority of a High Contracting Party is completely or
partially in conflict with the obligations arising from the present Con-
vention, and if the internal law of the said Party allows only partial
reparation to be made for the consequences of this decision or measure,
the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to
the injured party.
European Convention, supra note 13, art. 50 (emphasis added).
35. Article 53 of the European Convention states "[t]he High Contracting Parties un-
dertake to abide by the decision of the Court in any case to which they are parties."
European Convention, supra note 13, art. 53. Article 54 of the Convention states "[tihe
judgment of the court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers which shall su-
pervise its execution." European Convention, supra note 13, art. 54.
36. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2641, 7.
37. See id.
38. Paragraph 410 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure:
If, after a sentence (penalty) may no longer be appealed, mitigating cir-
cumstances emerge, which were not available or were not known at the
time of deliverance, and if, indeed, the use of another penal clause is
not involved, but nevertheless they plainly would have brought about a
more lenient assessment of the penalty, so the court of first jurisdiction
is to issue, as soon as it is satisfied as to the existence of these miti-
gating circumstances, a petition for reasonable relaxation of the penal-
ties to the court of second jurisdiction, which is to give a ruling on the
petition after hearing the attorney general. (2) No legal remedy is
permitted against denial of a petition for reduction in penalty. If the
court of second jurisdiction accedes to the petition for leniency on as-
sessment of penalty given by the highest court, then it is to present the
petition to the highest court, which is to give the final ruling after
hearing the attorney general.
§410 StPO (Phyllis Shorman trans.)
39. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2641, 1 7.
40. Article 5(5) of the European Convention allows an injured party to be compen-
sated for violations of their rights under Article 5(1)-(4). It reads as follows:
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall
be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance
with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person
after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention
of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in or-
der to secure the fulfillment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the
VOL. 27:4
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in Vienna (Zivilrechtssachen Wein) found for the Austrian government
on both claims. 41 On appeal, the Higher Regional Court in Vienna
(Oberlandesgericht Wien) affirmed the decision,42 based on Paragraph
2(3) of the Law on State Liability (Amtshaftungsgesetz).43 That para-
graph states in part "no claim for compensation could arise out of a
judgment of the Supreme Court."4 4  The judgment of the European
Court of Human Rights has Constitutional status in Austria, 45 and is
therefore binding.46 However, when the original case has achieved the
lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bring-
ing him before the competent legal authority on a reasonable suspicion
of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered
necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having
done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of
educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of
bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful deten-
tion of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious dis-
eases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or va-
grants; () the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his
effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against
whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language
which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge
against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 1(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly
before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial
power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to re-
lease pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantee to ap-
pear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness
of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release or-
dered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the vic-
tim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Ar-
ticle shall have an enforceable right to compensation.
European Convention, supra note 13, art. 5(5).
41. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2641-42, 1 9.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. Austria gave the European Convention constitutional status in their domestic
jurisprudence as a result of the Federal Constitution (Amendment) Act of March 1964.
Holly Dawn Jarmul, The Effect of Decisions of Regional Human Rights Tribunals on Na-
tional Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 311, 334 (Fall 1995-Winter 1996). However,
Austrian courts have been inconsistent in their application, sometimes finding the Euro-
pean Convention subordinate to Austrian domestic laws. Id. at 335.
46. See Eva Brems, Kremzow, 3 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 474, 475 (1997). See also Jean M.
Sera, Note, The Case for Accession by the European Union to the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights, 14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 151, 152 ("The European Convention
and the judgments of the ECHR are binding on all members of the Council of Europe
which have ratified the European Convention"). Austria was not an original member of
the Council of Europe; they joined in April 1956, and ratified the European Convention on
September 3, 1958. ANDRE Z. DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION IN
DOMESTIC LAW 93 (1983). See generally MARK W. JANIS ET AL, EURPOEAN HUMAN RIGHTS
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status of res judicata the effect of such judgment remains undecided in
Austrian Courts. 47 Kremzow was therefore unable to enforce the judg-
ment of the ECHR against the Austrian Supreme Court.
Under these circumstances, Kremzow filed an "extraordinary ap-
peal" 48 to the Austrian Supreme Court, 49 asking them to request the
European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on the issue of
whether the decision of the European Court of Human Rights is binding
on Austrian Courts.50 The Austrian Supreme Court stayed their pro-
ceedings and addressed two questions to the ECJ for preliminary rul-
ings. The Austrian Court first asked the following question:
Are all or at least the substantive-law provisions of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention")-including
the provisions of Articles 5,51 6, 52 and 5353 of the Conven-
tion which are relevant to the proceedings before the Ober-
ster Gerichtshof-part of Community law (Article 164
EC),54 with the result that the Court of Justice of the
European Communities may give a preliminary ruling on
their interpretation pursuant to the first paragraph of Ar-
ticle 17755 EC?56
LAW 428-450 (1995) (describing how the European Convention has the status of a treaty
and states are required to make the substantive ideas of the Convention applicable to citi-
zens).
47. See Brems, supra note 46, at 475.
48. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2642, 1 11.
49. One author suggests that the Austrian Supreme Court "possesses a strong con-
servative inclination generally, with an attitude of particular reserve towards the [Euro-
pean] Convention." DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra note 46, at 103. This is significant as Member
States national courts must act in accordance with the ideals of the European Convention
although there is no sufficient enforcement mechanism in place. See infra note 231 (Arti-
cle F of the TEU establishes this relationship.)
50. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2642, 1 11.
51. See European Convention, supra notes 13, 31, 41, art. 5.
52. See European Convention, supra notes 13, 31, 32, art. 6.
53. See European Convention, supra notes 13, 31, 36, art. 53.
54. Article 164 of the EEC Treaty states "[t]he Court of Justice shall ensure that in
the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed." EEC TREATY, su-
pra note 1, art. 164. The purpose of the European Community is explained in Article A of
the Treaty on European Union that states: "[t]he Union shall be founded on the European
Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of co-operation established by this
Treaty. Its task shall be to organise, in a manner demonstrating consistency and solidar-
ity, relations between the member-States and between their peoples." TEU, supra note 6,
art. A.
55. Article 177 of the EEC Treaty states:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
concerning: (a) the interpretation of this Treaty; (b) the validity and in-
terpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community and of the
ECB; (c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an
act of the Council; where those statutes so provide. Where such a ques-
VOL. 27:4
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Essentially, Austria asked the ECJ to determine the relationship
between the European Convention and European Union law. Austria's
second question was actually a series of five questions to be answered
only in the event that the first question was answered in the affirma-
tive.5 7 The ECJ never addressed the second question, since the first
question was answered in the negative; therefore, this case note will not
directly address it.58
III. COURT'S ANALYSIS AND DECISION
The ECJ, through Judge Rapporteur 59 and President of the Fifth
tion is raised before any court or tribunal of a member-State, that court
or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is neces-
sary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a
ruling thereon. Where any such question is raised in a case pending
before a court or tribunal of a member-State, against whose decisions
there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal
shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice.
EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 177.
56. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2642-43, 1 12(1).
57. See id. at 2642-43, 12(2)(a)-(e). The second question asked:
(2) Only in the event that Question 1 is answered in the affirmative,
at least as regards Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention: (a) Are na-
tional courts bound by judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights funding violations of the Convention at least to the extent
that they are not entitled to hold that the conduct of State institu-
tions to which the finding of a violation relates was in accordance
with the Convention? (b) Are claims for compensation for damage
based on Article 5(5) of the Convention precluded where the damage
flows from a decision of the Oberster Gerichtshof? (c) Is detention
within the meaning of Article 5(1)(a) of the Convention contrary to
the Convention ex tunc where the European Court of Human Rights
has found that, in the criminal proceedings, the national court was in
breach of the procedural safeguards enshrined in Article 6 of the
Convention? (d) Is the legal entity against which proceedings have
been brought for State liability entitled to plead that the punishment
would have been on no different a scale if the violation of Article 6 of
the Convention found by the European Court of Human Rights had
not occurred, although the Austrian law of criminal procedure - to
date - does not provide in such cases for proceedings for the revision
of a judgment or other amending proceedings by means of which the
procedural error could have been remedied? (e) Does the burden of
proving the causal connection between the violation of Article 6 of
the Convention and the deprivation of the plaintiffs liberty fall on
the plaintiff or does the burden of proof in respect of this defect fall
on the defendant legal entity?
Id. at 2642-44, 1 12.
58. See id. at 2646, 1 19.
59. In each case, the President of the ECJ appoints one Judge to serve as Judge Rap-
porteur. RENAUD DEHOUSSE, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 13 (1998). The job of the
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Chamber, J.C. Moitinho de Almeida, offered a brief opinion in response
to the preliminary rulings requested by the Austrian Supreme Court.60
After a summary of the factual background, the ECJ affirmed
Kremzow's position that he felt entitled to damages because his right to
freedom of movement under Article 8(a) of the Treaty of Rome.6 1 The
violation occurred when Austria unlawfully detained him in violation of
Community law. 62 To reach its conclusion, the ECJ's analysis relied en-
tirely on a series of five prior ECJ decisions: RE the Accession by the
Community to the European Human Rights Convention;63 Elliniki Ra-
diofonia Tileorassi Anonimi Etairia (ERT AE) and Another v. Dimotiki
Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Another;64 Society for the
Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. (SPUC) v. Steven Grogan
and Others;65 Hans Moser v. Land Baden-Wurttemberg;66 and Criminal
Proceedings Against Jean-Louis Maurin.67
The ECJ's first point was that "fundamental rights form an integral
part of the general principles of Community law."68 ECJ jurisprudence
has reiterated this ideology, most notably in Opinion 2/94, Re the Acces-
sion of the Community to the European Human Rights Convention,69
Judge Rapporteur is to create a preliminary report summarizing the case, which is dis-
tributed to the other judges to help them prepare for the hearing. Id. The Judge Rappor-
teur also prepares draft opinions on behalf of the chamber. Id. Because the position of
Judge Rapporteur is quite influential, judges are never assigned to cases originating from
their own country. Id.
60. See generally Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2637-47.
61. Article 8(a) of the EEC Treaty states in relevant part "[elvery citizen of the Union
shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member
States .... EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 8(a).
62. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2644, 1 13.
63. Opinion 2/94, RE the Accession by the Community to the European Human
Rights Convention, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 265 (1996).
64. Case 260/89, Elliniki Radiofonia Tileorassi Anonimi Etairia (ERT AE) and An-
other v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Another, 1991 E.C.R. I-
2925 [1991].
65. Case 159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. (SPUC) v.
Steven Grogan and Others, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4685, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849 (1991).
66. Case 180/83, Hans Moser v. Land Baden-Wurttemberg, 1984 E.C.R. 2539, [1984]
3 C.M.L.R. 720 (1984).
67. Case C-144/95, Criminal Proceedings Against Jean-Louis Maurin, 1996 E.C.R. I-
2909. Although the ECJ does not officially recognize precedent, they often act in confor-
mity with their previous decisions. HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 75. However, Kremzow is
particularly interesting since instances where the court directly cites their previous deci-
sions are extremely uncommon. Id. at 76
68. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 264, 1 14.
69. Opinion 2/94, RE the Accession by the Community to the European Human
Rights Convention, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 265 (1996). The ECJ stated
that, "it is well settled that fundamental rights form an integral part of the general prin-
ciples of law whose observance the Court ensures." Opinion 2/94, 2. C.M.L.R. at 290, 1
33. For an excellent discussion on the arguments for European Community accession to
the ECHR, see Tara C. Stever, Protecting Human Rights in the European Union: An Ar-
gument for Treaty Reform, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 919 (1997).
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which the Kremzow court relied upon. Opinion 2/94 was an advisory
opinion 70 requested by the Council of the European Community. 71 The
request arose after contemplating the idea of opening negotiations to
discuss accession by the Community to the European Convention.7 2
Under the authority of Article 228(6) of the Treaty of Rome, 73 the Coun-
cil asked the ECJ the following question: "Would the accession of the
European Community to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950 be compatible
with the Treaty establishing the European Community?" 74
The ECJ responded by describing a two-fold problem with Commu-
nity accession to the Convention. 75 First, the Community may not be
competent to make such a conclusion; and, second, there may be prob-
lems with the compatibility of the Community to the provisions of the
Treaty.76 The ECJ noted it has the capability to give an opinion when
provided with sufficient information concerning the issue. In that par-
ticular instance, adequate information was not provided to the ECJ,
therefore, it was not appropriate to offer an opinion on the issue of
whether accession by the European Community to the European Con-
vention would be compatible with the Treaty of Rome. 77 Second, the
ECJ asserted that both express and implied provisions of the Treaty of
Rome provide the requisite competence. 78 However, no provision within
the Treaty confers the Community institutions any general power to
enact rules on human rights or to conclude international conventions in
this field."79
In closing, the ECJ noted that Article 235 of the Treaty of Rome8 °
70. See infra notes 165-169 and accompanying text, for a discussion of advisory opin-
ions.
71. The Council of the European Community was created in Articles 145-154 of the
EEC Treaty. The function of the council is described in Article 146, which states in rele-
vant part "[To ensure the objectives set out in the Treaty are attained." EEC TREATY, sU-
pra note 1, art. 145. The Council has jurisdiction to bring issues before the ECJ through
Article 228(6), see infra note 73 (citing the text of Article 228(6)). Advisory opinions are
discussed in further detail, infra notes 165-169.
72. See Opinion 2/94, 2 C.M.L.R. at 267.
73. Article 228(6) states:
The Council, the Commission or a Member State may obtain the opin-
ion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is
compatible with the provisions of this Treaty. Where the opinion of the
Court of Justice is adverse, the agreement may come into force only in
accordance with Article N of the Treaty on European Union.
EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 228(6).
74. See Opinion 2/94, 2 C.M.L.R. at 269.
75. See id. at 288, 1 9.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 289.
78. See id. at 289, 1 26.
79. Id. at 290, 1 27.
80. Article 235 of the EEC Treaty states:
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can "fill the gap" when the Treaty of Rome does not include provisions
specific to issues raised in the ECJ.81 Article 235, however, cannot be
used to widen the scope of the Treaty of Rome in such a way as to in-
formally amend the Treaty of Rome.8 2 In the end, the ECJ held that the
European Convention had "special significance",8 3 but the Community
had "no competence to accede to the Convention"8 4 without significant
amendments to the Treaty of Rome.85 As in Kremzow, this opinion is
consistently cited by the ECJ as the primary authority against acces-
sion by the Community to the Convention. 86
The second issue that the ECJ addressed in Kremzow was that
"measures are not acceptable in the Community which are incompatible
with observance of the human rights thus recognized and guaran-
teed."8 7 To emphasize this point, the Court's opinion relied on Elliniki
Radiofonia Tileorassi Anonimi Etairia (ERT AE) and Another v. Dimo-
tiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Another (ERT
AE").88 ERT AE involved a state-owned Greek broadcasting monopoly,
ERT AE, that brought suit against an independent broadcasting agency
for violating ERT AE's exclusive right of monopoly. The Greek Court
asked the ECJ to make ten preliminary rulings about monopolies and
their consistency with European Community law.8 9 Question nine
asked the Convention to consider whether a monopoly controlling a
major service of a Member State is consistent with the "social objec-
tives" of the Treaty of Rome as well as the provisions of Article 10 of the
ECHR.90 Question ten asked if the freedom of expression guaranty of
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the
course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of
the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers,
the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commis-
sion and after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropri-
ate measures.
EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 235.
81. See Opinion 2/94, 2 C.M.L.R. at 290, 1 29.
82. See id. at 290, 30.
83. Id. at 291, 1 33.
84. Id. at 291, 36.
85. See id. at 291, 35.
86. See, e.g., Case 260/89, Elliniki Radiofonia Tileorassi Anonimi Etairia (ERT AE)
and Another v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Another, 1991
E.C.R. 1-2925, 1 41 [hereinafter ERT AE]; Case 159/90, Society for the Protection of Un-
born Children Ireland Ltd. (SPUC) v. Steven Grogan and Others, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4685,
[1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849, (1991), 1 30.
87. Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2645, 14.
88. ERTAE, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2925.
89. See id. J 5.
90. Id. J 4. A further discussion of the relationships between Article 10 of the Euro-
pean Convention and the ECJ is outside the scope of this paper. See, e.g., Benjamin L.
Apt., On the Right to Freedom of Expression in the European Union, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
69, 88-92 (1998) (noting the ECJ's inconsistency in applying Article 10 of the European
Convention, yet finding that the European Convention is beyond the scope of their juris-
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the ECHR and the social objectives of the Treaty of Rome create implied
obligations on Member States.91
In deciding questions nine and ten, the ERT AE Court first articu-
lated the idea from Re the Accession of the Community to the European
Human Rights Convention, that fundamental rights are integral to
Community law. 92 These "fundamental rights" are found through a va-
riety of sources including, common constitutional traditions, interna-
tional treaties to which Member States are parties, and the European
Convention. 93 Measures incompatible with fundamental human rights
are unacceptable in the European Community. 94 Next, the ECJ ex-
plained that its jurisdiction to make references sought by Member
States exists only when the issue is within the scope of Community
law,95 requiring the national court to apply the provisions in accordance
with Community law. 96 The ECJ concluded by finding that the limita-
tions imposed by the Treaty of Rome must be "appraised in the light of
the general principle of freedom of expression embodied in Article 10 of
the European Convention on Human Rights."97 Through a reference to
ERT AE, the Court in Kremzow acknowledged that Community law
must be read in accordance with the principles set forth in the Euro-
pean Convention when the issue directly involves Community law. 98
The third point that the ECJ made in their analysis of Kremzow
was that when an issue arises in the application of Community law, the
ECJ is obligated to assist the national court to the best of its ability to
act in conformity with both Community law and the European Conven-
tion. 99 The caveat is that when the issue falls outside the scope of
Community law, there is no jurisdiction for the ECJ to give a prelimi-
nary ruling or interpretative guidance.100 Many see this as one of the
most significant problems with the ECJ and the European Commu-
nity 101
The ECJ relied upon Society for the Protection of Unborn Children
diction).
91. See ERTAE, 1991 E.C.R., 4.
92. See id. 41.
93. See id.
94. See id. ("the Community cannot accept measures which are incompatible with
observance of the human rights thus recognized and guaranteed.").
95. See id. 1 42.
96. See id. 44.
97. Id. 1 45.
98. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2645, 1 14 ("measures are not acceptable in the
Community which are incompatible with observance of the human rights thus recognized
and guaranteed.").
99. See id. at 2645, 1 15.
100. See id.
101. See Apt, supra note 90, at 94 ("Grogan represents one of the most difficult in-
stances of incompatibility between cultural values particular to one nation and EU sub-
jective rights.').
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Ireland Ltd. (SPUC) v. Steven Grogan and Others (SPUC) to illustrate
this point. 102 This case concerned student groups at three Irish univer-
sities that published information about obtaining foreign abortions, 10 3
because abortion is illegal in Ireland. 10 4 SPUC, an organization dedi-
cated to prevent "the decriminalisation of abortion, and.., protect the
rights of unborn life from the moment of conception 1° 5 brought suit
against the student groups to prohibit them from publishing further in-
formation on foreign abortions. 10 6 The Irish Supreme Court found the
student's activities violated the Irish Constitution. The student groups,
however, ignored the decision of the Irish Supreme Court and continued
to publish information on foreign abortions. 107 Following this disobedi-
ence by the student groups, SPUC attempted to obtain an injunction
against the student groups from continuing to publish this controversial
information. 0 8 The High Court declined to make an immediate ruling,
and filed preliminary rulings with the ECJ.109 In the meantime, SPUC
appealed to the Supreme Court who granted the injunction, but allowed
the ECJ to decide the preliminary rulings. 110 The students argued that
the actions taken by the Irish courts breached their freedom of expres-
sion under Article 10(1) of the European Convention. 11'
The ECJ answered the preliminary rulings by again nodding to the
notion that fundamental rights are integral to the Community. 112 The
ECJ next stated that the function of the ECJ is to "give the national
court all the guidance as to interpretation necessary" to make a decision
in compliance with the European Convention when the issue was
within the scope of Community law. 113 Because this issue fell outside
the scope of Community law, the ECJ could not offer interpretive guid-
ance to the Irish Courts."l4 The ECJ finally held that it was "not con-
trary to Community law for a Member State... to prohibit students as-
sociations from distributing information. .. ."115 In Kremzow, the ECJ
used this case to illustrate that when an issue falls outside the scope of
102. Case 159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. (SPUC) v.
Steven Grogan and Others, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4685, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849 (1991) [hereinafter
SPuC].
103. See SPUC, 3 C.M.L.R. at 855.
104. See id. at 887, 1 3.
105. Id. at 887, 1 2.
106. See id. at 855.
107. See id. at 888, 1 7.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 888, 1 8.
110. See id.
111. Article 10(1) states in relevant part, "[elveryone has the right to freedom of ex-
pression." European Convention, supra note 13, art. 10(1).
112. See SPUC, 3 C.M.L.R at 892,1 30
113. Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2645, 1 15.
114. See SPUC, 3 C.M.L.R at 892, 1 31.
115. Id. at 893.
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Community law, the ECJ does not have jurisdiction to offer interpretive
guidance. 116
The fourth issue the Kremzow Court addressed was that a hypo-
thetical possibility of restraint upon his right to freedom of movement
does not create a "sufficient connection with Community law to justify
the application of Community provisions."117 To emphasize this point,
the ECJ referred to Hans Moser v. Land Baden-Wurttemberg (Moser),
decided in 1984.118 This case centered on Moser, a man prohibited from
earning his teaching certificate due to his affiliation with the German
Communist party. 119 Moser sued the Land authorities for their refusal
to allow him to take the certification exams and to prohibit him from
the possibility of teaching in another Member State. 120 The ECJ
strongly disagreed with Moser's attempt to establish a weak connection
with Community law when there was no German remedy available to
him. 121
The ECJ first stated that Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome 122 was
not applicable to exclusively internal issues of a Member State. 123 The
ECJ went on to find that "purely hypothetical"'124 issues brought by a
party are not actionable, and a person cannot rely on Community law
"to contest the application to him of the legislation of his own coun-
try."'125 In Kremzow, Moser supported the analysis that hypothetical
situations, created purely to establish a connection to the Community,
are insufficient to apply Treaty of Rome provisions to an individual or a
Member State.126
The final analytical point the ECJ made was that Kremzow's pun-
ishment was for the violation of a national law, not a community law. 127
The crimes he committed (murder and illegal possession of a weapon)
were within the exclusive realm of national law 128 and were not created
116. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2645, 15 ("however, the Court has no such jurisdic-
tion with regard to national legislation lying outside the scope of community law.").
117. Id. at 2645 16. In contrast, actual depravation of a citizen's right to freedom of
movement is actionable by the ECJ. Id.
118. Case 180/83, Hans Moser v. Land Baden-Wurttemberg, 1984 E.C.R. 2539, [1984]
3 C.M.L.R. 720 (1984).
119. See Moser, 3 C.M.L.R. at 722.
120. See id. at 725, 1 4.
121. See id. at 728, 11 18-20.
122. Article 48(1) of the EEC Treaty states "[F]reedom of movement for workers shall
be secured within the Community ... " EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 48.
123. See Moser, 3 C.M.L.R. at 727, 1 15.
124. Id. at 728, 1 18.
125. Id. at 728, 1 20.
126. Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2645, 1 16 ("a purely hypothetical prospect of exercising
that right [right to free movement] does not establish a sufficient connection with Com-
munity law to justify the application of Community provisions').
127. See id. at 2646, 1 17
128. See id.
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or intended to comply with Community law.129 The Court referred to a
1996 opinion, Criminal Proceedings Against Jean-Louis Maurin
(Maurin) to make their final point. 130
The Maurin case involved a man arrested for selling food past the
expiration date on the package. In his defense, Maurin relied on a
French procedural rule, asserting that because the head of the investi-
gation did not sign the police report, the report was void under both
French national law and the European Convention. 131 The case was
brought before the ECJ on a preliminary ruling to determine whether
the French national law was "compatible with the general principles of
law laid down by the ECJ."'132 The ECJ found it lacked jurisdiction to
decide a matter of exclusive national legislation that was not within the
purview of Community law. 133 The holding in Moser is substantially
similar to the holding in Kremzow, both refused to give a preliminary
ruling on issues falling outside the scope of Community law.
After the brief discussion of these five cases, the Kremzow Court
held that the question, whether the European Convention is substan-
tively part of Community law allowing the ECJ to give preliminary
rulings on the interpretation of the European Convention, did not fall
inside the scope of Community law. 34 The questions were concerned
with Austrian national legislation not Community law, therefore, the
Court could not give the Austrian Supreme Court a preliminary rul-
ing. 135 The refusal of the ECJ to provide interpretative guidance to the
Austrian Supreme Court demonstrates its attempt to further define the
scope of Community law by refusing to extend ECJ jurisdiction to in-
clude the European Convention.
IV. DISCUSSION
This case note will first look briefly at the history and jurisdiction
of the ECJ in order to establish the context for the following discussion.
129. See id.
130. Case C-144/95, Criminal Proceedings Against Jean-Louis Maurin, 1996 E.C.R. I-
2909 [1996]. Maurin is similar to Kremzow as both cases concern national criminal pro-
ceedings and their relationship to Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome. EEC TREATY, supra
note 1, art. 177. It is possible that Maurin heavily influenced the final decision in
Kremzow, as it is the capstone of the Court's analysis.
131. See Maurin, 1996 E.C.R., 1 3.
132. Id. J 6.
133. See id. 12. See also Krenzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2646, J 17 ("Mr. Kremzow was sen-
tenced for murder and for illegal possession of a firearm under provisions of national law
which were not designed to secure compliance with rules of Community law."). See also
Case 12/86, Demirel v. Stadt Schwaebisch Gmuend, 1987 E.C.R. 3719, 1 28 (1987).
134. Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2646, 1 19.
135. Id.
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Next, it will examine human rights in Europe and argue that they are
protected through a number of other European and international insti-
tutions. These institutions negate the necessity for the ECJ to offer ad-
ditional protection. Finally, this paper will conclude that it is in the
best interest of Europe to allow the ECJ to limit its authority to matters
exclusively within the scope of Union law, rather than extending its ju-
risdiction to include human rights issues.
A. History and Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice
The European Court of Justice is the primary judicial branch of the
European Union, created by Articles 164-188 of the Treaty of Rome.1 36
The main function of the ECJ is to "ensure that in the interpretation
and application of this Treaty, the law is observed."'137 Historically, the
ECJ was the final authority on Union law in terms of its application
within the European Union; between the European Union and Member
States; and, between individuals and the European Union.' 38 Eventu-
ally, the extraordinary workload of the ECJ became too burdensome
and the ECJ suggested establishing a secondary court to handle a por-
tion of their caseload. 139 This suggestion lead to the creation of the
Court of First Instance (CFI) in 1989.140 The CFI has the authority to
hear a variety of cases and their decisions are only reviewable by the
ECJ on legal issues.' 4 ' Essentially, the CFI takes away the burden of
routine cases, allowing the ECJ to concentrate on cases that the court
can use to further develop and clarify EU law.' 42
136. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, arts. 164-188. For additional information on the
European Union, see generally CAIRNS, supra note 6.
137. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 164. For a provocative analysis of the legal the-
ory and justifications used by the ECJ, see JOXERRAMON BENGOETXEA, THE LEGAL
REASONING OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (1992).
138. See CAIRNS, supra note 6, at 34.
139. See L. NEVILLE BROWN & FRANCIS G. JACOBS, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 64 (3rd ed. 1989).
140. See CAIRNS, supra note 6, at 35. The Court of First Instance ("CFI') was created
by Article 168(a) of the EEC Treaty. Article 168(a) reads in relevant part:
A Court of First Instance shall be attached to the Court of Justice with
jurisdiction to hear and determine at first instance, subject to a right of
appeal to the Court of Justice on points of law only and in accordance
with the conditions laid down by the Statute, certain classes of action
or proceeding defined in accordance with the conditions laid down in
paragraph 2. The Court of First Instance shall not be competent to hear
and determine questions referred for a preliminary ruling under Article
177.
EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 168(a).
141. See CAIRNS, supra note 6, at 34
142. See id, at 35. The Court of First Instance has limited jurisdiction and hears all
actions that concern EU trademark laws, staff cases, competition cases, plant variety
rights cases and cases brought by individual plaintiffs. DINNAGE & MURPHY, supra note
6, at 34-35.
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The ECJ has no inherent jurisdiction 143 but derives its broad juris-
diction from the EU Treaty, specifically Articles 177-183.144 There are
three main categories of the ECJ's jurisdiction: judgments, opinions and
appellate jurisdiction over the Court of First Instance. 145
The most common source of jurisdiction for the ECJ are judgments,
a loose term describing any number of actions brought before the
ECJ.146 Judgments concern the intricate relationship between Union
law and Member States' law, and are considered fundamentally impor-
tant in effectuating Union law within the Member States. 147 There are
two types of judgments: direct actions and preliminary rulings. 148
Direct actions arise when the ECJ has jurisdiction by agreement or
direct application of the law. 149 Direct actions begin at the ECJ, and
the ECJ is the final decision maker; there is no appellate procedure. 150
This type of judgment concerns issues brought by or against Member
States, any of the Union's institutions, and in rare cases, by private
citizens of the EU. 151
Preliminary rulings are often requested when the national court of
a Member State is faced with an issue that directly relates to the appli-
cation of EU law within that State. 152 The national court requests a
preliminary ruling from the ECJ, and the ECJ has the jurisdiction to
decide these issues under Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome. 153 The de-
cision reached by the ECJ on a specific point of EU law is then adopted
by the national court to its own decision. 154 The ECJ has jurisdiction to
make preliminary rulings on three issues: treaty interpretation, ques-
tions of validity, and interpretation regarding acts of Union institutions
and interpretation of statutes created by EU institutions. 155 This was
the basis for the Court's jurisdiction in Kremzow, the Austrian Supreme
Court asked the ECJ to make preliminary rulings on two questions
dealing with the application of Union law to Austrian national law. 156
The rationale behind the Court's involvement with preliminary
143. HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 56.
144. See EEC TREATY, supra note 5, arts. 177-83.
145. See BROWN & JACOBS, supra note 139, at 71-75. See generally HARTLEY, supra
note 1, at 58-63.
146. See HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 58-61. See also BROWN & JACOBS, supra note 139,
at 71-73.
147. See HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 58-61.
148. See id. at 59.
149. See id. at 61. See also BENGOETXEA, supra note 137, at 14-15.
150. See HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 61.
151. See id. at 61.
152. See HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 59. See also BENGOETXEA, supra note 137, at 15.
153. See EEC TREATY, supra note 6, art. 177. Full text of Article 177 is supra note 55.
154. See HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 59.
155. See EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 177. Full text of Article 177 is supra note 55.
156. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2642-44, 1 12.
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rulings is to ensure consistency in terms of application and interpreta-
tion of Community law within Member States because consistency is
widely recognized as the hallmark for a successful and functional com-
munity. 157 Preliminary rulings have been a primary vehicle for the ECJ
to define and shape Union law.'58 Recent criticism of the ECJ suggests
the ECJ has not offered Member States adequate guidance in their
opinions on preliminary rulings, leaving Member States to interpret the
judgment as they see fit.15 9 This significantly increases the potential for
inconsistent judgments by the Member States. 160
In addition to preliminary rulings and direct actions, judgments
can be in the form of actions against Member States, 16' judicial review
of community acts, 162 and plenary jurisdiction, 163 although a large part
of the Court's former authority over plenary jurisdiction has been dele-
gated to the CFI.164
The second form of jurisdiction of the ECJ is that of advisory opin-
ions.165 Article 228(6) of the EU Treaty authorizes this jurisdiction by
explaining:
The Council, the Commission or a Member State may
obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether
an agreement envisaged is compatible with the provi-
sions of this Treaty. Where the opinion of the Court of
Justice is adverse, the agreement may enter into force
157. See, e.g., P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 66 (1985).
It is interesting to compare the system of interpretation of Union law to the system of ap-
pellate procedure in the United States. Preliminary rulings are a feature unique to the
ECJ. There is no similar system in the United States, whereby a State court can ask a
Federal court for any kind of interpretive guidance before they reach a decision. Because
interpretation of Union law is such a critical role for national courts throughout the EU
throughout the EU, many issues have been raised before the ECJ before they are decided
by the national court. See DINNAGE & MURPHY, supra note 6, at 360.
158. See BENGOETXEA, supra note 137, at 15.
159. See CAIRNS, supra note 6, at 301.
160. See id. See also Stever, supra note 69, at 943-46 (summarizing the ECJ's deci-
sion in Solange I and commenting that the legal consistency of the European Community
is jeopardized when 'Member State courts do not agree on an interpretation of EC law
and apply varying forms of a directive.").
161. See BROWN & JACOBS, supra note 139, at 76. Actions against Member States oc-
cur when a Member State is charged with not fulfilling its obligations under the EEC
Treaty and the ECJ has the jurisdiction to hear these cases based on Articles 169 and 170
of the EEC Treaty. Id.
162. See id. at 95-96. The ECJ has jurisdiction to judicially review acts of the EU un-
der Articles 173 and 179 of the EEC Treaty. Id.
163. See id. at 131-32. Plenary jurisdiction is a French concept that was adopted by
the EU. Id at 131. It refers to the Court's ability to have jurisdiction over issues con-
cerning penalties established by the Treaty. The ECJ derives its plenary jurisdiction
from Articles 172, 178, and 179 of the EEC Treaty. Id.
164. See id. at 132.
165. See HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 59.
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only in accordance with Article N of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union.1 66
Advisory opinions are used preemptively when the Council, the
Commission, or a Member State is unsure of the compatibility of a fu-
ture action with the Treaty. 167 Advisory opinions are rarely used be-
cause they ask the Court to define the scope of a particular aspect EU
Treaty.168 If the ECJ concludes that the action in question is outside
the purview of the Treaty only an amendment to the Treaty providing
for such action, will legitimate the action.169
The ECJ's final area of jurisdiction is appellate jurisdiction over is-
sues of law arising in the Court of First Instance.' 70 This is a new form
of jurisdiction for the ECJ, and is exclusively limited to points of law. 171
An appeal may arise from any infringement of Union law, including ul-
tra vires actions 172 and procedural errors. 173 When the ECJ accepts an
appeal from the CFI, the decision of the CFI is no longer valid and the
ECJ must either decline a final judgment or remand the case back to
the CFI for further proceedings. 174
Although the CFI relieved some of the burden on the ECJ, the
number of cases pending before the ECJ remains staggering. 175 There-
fore, the CFI has done little to reduce the backlog of cases for the ECJ
even though the CFI remains busy in its own right.176 Adding human
rights issues to the ECJ's already broad jurisdictional base would
greatly increase the already dramatic backlog of cases awaiting decision
by the ECJ.
B. European Human Rights are Protected through other European and
International Institutions.
The Kremzow decision naturally introduces the question of whether
the European Union offers sufficient human rights protection to its
166. EEC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 228(6). Full text of Article 228(6) is supra, note
73.
167. See BROWN & JACOBS, supra note 139, at 203. See also EEC TREATY, supra note
1, art. 228(6).
168. See also HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 59.
169. See BROWN & JACOBS, supra note 139, at 203. See also EEC TREATY, supra note
1, art. 228(6).
170. See BROWN & JACOBS, supra note 139, at 75.
171. See HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 62.
172. The doctrine of ultra vires refers to an action taken by a legislative body that is
outside the scope of their authority. WEBSTERS THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
2480 (1993).
173. See HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 62.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 58.
176. See id.
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Member States. At first, it may appear paradoxical that the Kremzow
Court proclaimed fundamental rights as integral to the Union, then re-
fused to make a decision on the human rights issue presented by this
case. 177 However, the issue of human rights in Europe is significantly
more complex. Kremzow should be analyzed within the complete spec-
trum of human rights protection, both on a European scale and world-
wide scale, rather than an exclusive province of the ECJ. The following
paragraphs will discuss the proposition that human rights are more
than adequately protected throughout Europe. 178 Further, there is an
urgent need to allow the ECJ to limit its jurisdiction if it is to remain a
legitimate and successful judicial body. 179
European human rights are protected on multiple levels through a
network of Treaties, State practice, and the European Court of Human
Rights.' 80 The European Convention was established as a regional ef-
fort to secure the fundamental human rights described in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.' 8 ' To enforce and protect the ideals set
forth in the European Convention, the Treaty also established the
European Court of Human Rights.'8 2 The Council of Europe, whose
Member States are all signatories to the European Convention,'8 3 dif-
fers in structure, function, and purpose from the EU. 8 4 The Council of
Europe was established as a political body for the promotion of Euro-
pean unity, 8 5 while the EU (and its predecessor the European Eco-
nomic Community) was created to develop Europe's economic inter-
ests.' 8 6 Interestingly, the fifteen Member States of the European Union
are all members of the Council of Europe, and signatories to the Euro-
pean Convention.'8 7 Because these two bodies are separate, the ECJ
governs only the European Union and has no jurisdiction over issues
arising from the Council of Europe or the European Convention. 8 8 To
further confuse these two institutions, ECJ opinions frequently recog-
177. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2644, 1 13.
178. See, e.g., Brems, supra note 46, at 478-79.
179. Id.
180. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2645, 1 14.
181. See European Convention, supra note 13, at preamble ("Being resolved, as the
Governments of European countries which are likeminded and have a common heritage of
political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law to take the first steps for the col-
lective enforcement of certain of the Rights stated in the Universal Declaration.")
182. See supra, note 13 and accompanying text (describing the ECHR).
183. See supra, note 7 and accompanying text (describing the European Convention).
184. See supra, note 6. See also Sera, supra note 46, at 152.
185. For further information on the Council of Europe, see Leuprecht, supra note 7, at
313-36 (providing a historical analysis of the Council of Europe and its human rights pro-
tections).
186. See CLEMENTS, supra note 13, at 2-3.
187. Compare supra note 6 (describing the EU) with supra note 7 (describing the
Council of Europe).
188. See EEC TREATY, supra note 1, arts. 164-88.
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nize that the fundamental freedoms represented by the European Con-
vention are integral to the ideals of the European Union.18 9
When the European Community, now integrated as the EU, was
established through the Treaty of Rome, the Treaty failed to include ba-
sic human rights provisions.190 The 1993 amendments to the Treaty of
Rome, the Treaty on European Union, remedied this situation in part
through Article F, which states that "[t]he Union shall respect funda-
mental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome
on 4 November 1950."191 The extent to which Article F should be inter-
preted as providing human rights protection to the European Union and
its Member States is the subject of current debate. 192 Currently, Article
F is not enforceable by the ECJ based upon Article L of the Treaty on
European Union.193 The failure of the EU to provide its members with
adequate human rights protection is seen by many people as a funda-
mental problem of the EU. v4
As noted above, all members of the EU (which does not provide a
bill of rights for basic human rights) are also members of the Council of
Europe (which does provide a bill of rights for basic human rights). 195
Therefore, all members of the EU receive regional human rights protec-
tion through their affiliation with the Council of Europe. Clearly, there
189. See Sera, supra note 46, at 161.
190. See generally EEC TREATY, supra note 1.
191. TEU, supra note 6, art. F. Full text of Article F is infra, note 231.
192. See infra, notes 231-235 and accompanying text.
193. Article L of the TEU states:
The provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community,
the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and
the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community con-
cerning the powers of the Court of Justice of the European Communi-
ties and the exercise of those powers shall apply only to the following
provisions of this Treaty: (a) provisions amending the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Economic Community with a view to establishing
the European Community, the Treaty establishing the European Coal
and Steel Community and the Treaty establishing the European
Atomic Energy Community; (b) the third subparagraph of Article
K.3(2)(c); (c) Articles L-S.
TEU, supra note 6, art. L (emphasis added).
194. See Sera, supra note 46, at 185. Sera makes the argument that accession to the
European Convention would solve many of the problems faced by the EU resulting from
their lack of a bill of rights. See also Stever, supra note 69, at 991 ("The European Com-
munity should amend the EEC TREATY to allow for accession to the ECHR so that the
European Community, along with Member States and institutions, will be held account-
able consistently for human rights violations.").
195. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. See also Sera, supra note 46, at 154
('The Council of Europe, an organization entirely independent from the EU, has as its
thirty-nine members all European states, and among them are all the Member-States of
the EU."). This was written before Russia, the 40th member, joined the Council of Europe.
See supra, note 7.
604 VOL. 27:4
KREMZOW V. REPUBLIK OSTERREICH
is a significant overlap between the Member States of these two institu-
tions. There are strong arguments that both institutions are better
served by performing separate tasks. Specifically, to leave the moni-
toring of human rights exclusively to the Council of Europe while the
European Union focuses on the economic aspect of the Union. The case
note will later discuss this issue in detail. 196
While Europe has a comprehensive set of treaties and conventions
protecting against human rights abuse, further human rights protection
is available to individual Member States by becoming signatories to
various international declarations and conventions. 197 Many European
countries support the international efforts to combat human rights
abuse by signing these declarations and conventions, including the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 198 the Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights,199the Convention on Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, 200 the Convention Against Torture,20' the Genocide
Convention,20 2 the Convention on the Rights of the Child,203 and the
Convention on Discrimination Against Women. 204 Since each Member
State possesses the discretion to ratify international conventions, not
all members of the EU are signatories to all of the conventions listed
above. 20 5 Through these various mechanisms, Europe has successfully
established a multi-layered system of human rights protection for its
citizens. 206
One caveat to any criticism of the European human rights system
is that this issue must be analyzed on a global scale rather than in a
purely regional context. Europe, as a unified community, represents
the most exceptional human rights system currently in place.207 The
issues arising before the European Courts are relatively sophisticated
196. See infra, notes 237-247 and accompanying text.
197. See Stever, supra note 69, at 968-69.
198. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (1948).
199. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3.
200. Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 7, 1966, 5 I.L.M
352.
201. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027, as modified 24 I.L.M. 535.
202. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 227.
203. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448.
204. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 33.
205. See, e.g., signatories to Conventions listed supra, notes 196-204.
206. See ROBERTSON & MERRILS, supra note 8, at 156.
207. "Over the years, the Council of Europe has set up a system of human rights pro-
tection which, in spite of certain weaknesses and shortcomings, can be regarded as the
most advanced international human rights structure in the world today." Leuprecht, su-
pra note 7, at 314. See also JANIS, supra note 46, at 3; ROBERTSON & MERRILS, supra note
8, at 156.
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compared to human rights violations occurring in other parts of the
world.208 When Kremzow is examined through this perspective, the
case takes on a different demeanor. It is not a globally recognized right
or even custom to allow a convicted murderer to appeal their judgment
on human rights grounds. Kremzow's application for relief based on his
inability to defend himself in person would be difficult to sustain in
many parts of the world. Nevertheless, Kremzow was successful at the
ECHR when it recognized this as a violation of his rights under the
European Convention. 20 9
The European multi-layered system for human rights protection
clearly reveals the adequate protection available to both individuals
and Member States of various European supranational bodies. 210
Therefore, the ECJ, created purely as the judicial body for the EU, does
not deny the EU basic human rights when it refuses to define the rela-
tionship between the EU and the European Convention. Instead, the
ECJ has the luxury of limiting its jurisdiction and allowing other insti-
tutions created expressly for the protection of human rights, the ECHR,
to adjudicate without interference from them. Defining the jurisdic-
tional limits between the ECJ and the ECHR benefits both judicial
bodies; it allows the ECJ to focus on EU law while permitting the
ECHR to be the lone decisionmaker on European human rights is-
sues.
211
C. Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice Should be Limited to
Matters of Union Law Exclusively.
After Kremzow, the following question remains: is the inability of
the ECJ to provide guidance regarding the European Convention in the
best interest of the European Union and its Member States? The en-
during question presented by the Kremzow decision surfaces in the ju-
risprudence of the ECJ and is the subject of endless debate within the
international human rights field. One position supports accession by
the Union to the European Convention as the most effective way to es-
tablish human rights for the Union.212 Another position asserts that
208. See ROBERTSON & MERRILS, supra note 8, at 156. Robertson and Merrills com-
ment that "[Tihe systematic torture of political prisoners, arrest of persons who then 'dis-
appear', persecution of political opponents, imprisonment of human rights activists, and
other practices which are prevalent elsewhere pose problems which are immeasurably
more serious than those which constitute the day-to-day business of the European or-
gans." Id.
209. See Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2640-41, 1 6.
210. See supra notes 197-209.
211. For an interesting comparison of the relationships between the ECHR, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, and their respective Member States, see Jarmul, supra
note 45, at 311-65
212. Stever, supra note 69, at 919.
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the Treaty of Rome should incorporate a bill of rights. 21 3 Others sug-
gest that perhaps human rights are already sufficiently incorporated
into the EU through Article F of the Treaty on European Union. 21 4 This
case note argues a different position, that human rights are already suf-
ficiently protected in Europe through the multi-layered system dis-
cussed earlier, and the ECJ must limit its caseload to issues of Union
law if it is to remain a successful and legitimate judicial body.
The first position mentioned argues that accession to the Union is
the most effective way to establish human rights for the Union. 21 5 This
position asserts that the EU should ratify the European Convention
and amend the Treaty of Rome to allow for individual access to the ECJ
on human rights issues. 216 Procedurally, an individual bringing a hu-
man rights claim would first exhaust all national remedies, appeal to
the ECJ, and finally appeal to the ECHR - the final decisionmaker for
human rights issues in Europe. 217 This position, heavily promoted a
few years ago, 218 now appears to have lost some of its momentum. 219
One problem with EU accession to the European Convention is that
it would severely alter the current structure of the ECJ. By allowing
for individual petitions to the ECJ, there is the potential that the effects
of a national court decision would be minimized, which could turn the
ECJ into an appellate court for all forty Member States of the Council of
Europe. Another reason why this suggestion is problematic is that the
ECJ is currently the final judicial authority on EU issues. By subject-
ing the ECJ to review by the ECHR, the ECJ would be no more than a
supranational appellate court, a position entirely foreign to the ECJ,
and arguably an undesirable position for any supranational court. This
fundamental structural shift would demand a number of ramifications
at both the Member State level and the judicial level.220 Additionally,
problems could arise, as the ECJ would be responsible for interpreting
another treaty that is already competently interpreted by the ECHR.221
213. See, e.g., Sera, supra note 46, at 178.
214. See infra notes 231-235 and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., Stever, supra note 69, at 919 (arguing that accession by the Union to
the European Convention is the most desirable solution to promote human rights in the
EU):
216. See Sera, supra note 46, at 178.
217. See id. at 178-79.
218. See, e.g., Stever, supra note 69, at 919; Sera, supra note 46, at 176-85.
219. See Leuprecht, supra note 7, at 335 ("the prospects for Community (or Union)
accession seem rather more remote than a few years ago.").
220. See generally Mary Frances Dominick, Toward a Community Bill of Rights: The
European Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 639,
668 (1990/1991) ("As a federated Europe comes closer to reality, it is essential that its in-
stitutional framework contain explicit, envocable, and directly effective fundamental pro-
tections for those whom the governments are designed to serve.").
221. The ECHR is guided by the European Convention. See supra note 13, arts. 38-
1999
DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Accession would place a large burden upon the ECJ by increasing its
caseload, and arguably alter the caseload of the ECHR only minimally,
as human rights issues could still be appealed to the ECHR from the
ECJ.222 It is unclear if this position suggests that the ECHR would ex-
clusively function as a supreme court, or if individuals would be able to
appeal directly to the ECHR and bypass the ECJ.
A different position suggests the Treaty of Rome should incorporate
a bill of rights; establishing human rights protections for the EU and
enforceable by the ECJ.223 An interesting parallel is to compare the
EU's potential to adopt a bill of rights to the United States, as a loose
federation adopting the same document two hundred years ago. Just as
the American Constitution originally failed to provide American citizens
with comprehensive human rights protections, the Treaty of Rome
failed to provide citizens of the EU with such protections. The United
States remedied this situation three years after the ratification of the
Constitution when the States ratified the first ten amendments, collec-
tively known as the "Bill of Rights".224 Europe approached human
rights protections for its citizens in an entirely different manner. The
Treaty of Rome, establishing what has now become the European Un-
ion, was signed in 1957 and, as discussed earlier, did not provide hu-
man rights protections.225 However, the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was passed
and entered into force, four years before Europe had a unifying
treaty.226 The European Convention established comprehensive human
rights protections for all of Europe and created a special supranational
judicial body to adjudicate this issue, the European Court of Human
Rights.227 While the United States established a union prior to offering
human rights protections, Europe accomplished human rights protec-
tion before creation of their unifying body.228 It is possible to propose
222. See Sera, supra note 46, at 179 ("Once an individual has exhausted all of her "na-
tional remedies" up through the ECJ, she would then have the opportunity to appeal to
[what is now the unified ECHR in Strasbourg].").
223. See, e.g., id. at 178 ("there have been occasions in which the European Commu-
nity has proposed and agreed to an enumerated list of rights that should be protected in
the Community.").
224. U.S. CONST. arts. 1-10 (1791).
225. See also text accompanying supra notes 185-189 (discussing the failure of the
EEC Treaty to include human rights protections). See generally EEC TREATY, supra note
1.
226. See European Convention, supra note 13. It is important to remember that the
European Convention was created by the Council of Europe, an entirely different body
than the European Union and the extent to which human rights are protected in Europe
today stem from the difference in these two bodies. See supra, notes 13 and accompany-
ing text.
227. See European Convention, supra note 13, arts. 38-56; ECHR, supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
228. Compare U.S. CONST. arts. 1-10 (incorporating the Bill of Rights into the United
States Constitution) with European Convention, supra note 13, arts. 1-66 (providing hu-
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that establishing human rights protections was of greater importance to
Europe than unionization. This comparison will become even more pro-
vocative should Europe make the decision to unionize to the extent that
the United States has.
It is unlikely that the EU will adopt a bill of rights for a number of
reasons. First, the Member States of the EU are already provided with
more than adequate human rights protection through their individual
accession to the European Convention.229 It would be redundant for the
ECJ to enforce the same treaty over similar jurisdiction as the ECHR.
Second, this suggestion is not a solution to the lack of human rights
protection in the EU because there is nothing to suggest that decisions
from the ECJ would be any different than without a bill of rights, as
they already profess that fundamental rights are integral to Union
law. 230
Another position asserts that European human rights are ade-
quately protected through an interpretation of Article F of the Treaty
on European Union as binding the Union to the European Conven-
tion.231 A debate of current interest is the extent to which Article F ac-
tually incorporates the European Convention into the EU. Article F,
which requires the EU to "respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by
the European Convention", is the primary manner that the EU cur-
rently provides human rights protections to its citizens. 232 As previ-
ously mentioned, the major drawback to utilizing Article F as the main
human rights enforcement mechanism for the EU is that it is unen-
man rights and fundamental freedoms protection for the Council of Europe).
229. Member States of the EU are listed supra, note 6.
230. See Sera, supra note 46, at 178. Furthermore, Sera argues that this option is
heavily criticized because it does not give citizens of the EU notice of what liberties are
protected by a potential bill of rights. Id. However, this critique is difficult to understand
from an American point of view because notice is traditionally satisfied when it is made
public through an accepted medium. From this perspective, it is hard to imagine that
such a sweeping change in ECJ jurisprudence would not be made public to EU citizens in
an acceptable manner, to put them on notice of these new protections. See also Kremzow,
3 C.M.L.R. at 264, 1 14 ("fundamental rights for an integral part of the general principles
of Community law.").
231. See Sera, supra note 46, at 153. Article F of the Treaty on European Union pro-
vides:
1. The Union shall respect the national identities of its member-States,
whose systems of government are founded on the principles of democ-
racy. 2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as
they result from the constitutional traditions common to the member-
States, as general principles of Community law. 3. The Union shall
prove itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry
through its policies.
TEU, supra note 6, art. F.
232. TEU, supra note 6, art. F. Full text of Article F is supra note 231.
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forceable by the ECJ.233 Due to this anomaly, the ECJ specifically
found that the human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed in
the European Convention "form an integral part of the general princi-
ples of Community law",234 a position they frequently reaffirm. 235 Al-
though the ECJ may choose to reaffirm this position in every case, it
does not change the fact that it is not bound to enforce the European
Convention.
The final position and the position articulated by this case note is
that limiting the ECJ case load to issues arising exclusively from the
EU Treaty would best serve the EU. A successful judicial body requires
that the ECJ limits its caseload to some degree. The ECJ has already
done this, in part, by limiting the scope of its jurisdiction to the issues
set out in Articles 164-188 of the EU Treaty.236 Thus, the ECJ limited
its jurisdiction by excluding issues that are of purely national interest
to Member States and not relevant to Union law.237 By excluding itself
from the internal jurisprudence of Member States, the ECJ clearly as-
serts that their function is not to serve as an additional national Su-
preme Court for each of the fifteen Member States who are signatories
to the EU Treaty.238 The decision by the ECJ to limit its case load pro-
vides the dual function of: (1) offering security to national courts of
knowing that the ECJ will not interfere with their purely internal is-
sues, while (2) providing the ECJ with a more limited function and al-
lowing them to concentrate on the application of EU law.
Within this framework, it becomes easier to understand the ECJ's
predicament when faced with a case such as Kremzow. 2 39 Since there is
no legal obligation for the ECJ to follow the European Convention, 240
they cannot offer interpretive guidance on human rights issues falling
within the scope of Convention law. 241 Therefore, as seen in Kremzow,
the court may acknowledge that human rights exist in Union law, but
may not offer interpretive guidance to the Member State because the
233. See id. art. L. Full text of Article L is supra, note 193.
234. Opinion 2/94, 2 C.M.L.R. at 290.
235. See, e.g., Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 264, 1 14; Case 260/89, ERTAE, 1991 E.C.R. I-
2925, at 41.
236. Jurisdiction over preliminary rulings is set out in Article 177, supra note 56. To
examine the ECJ's jurisdiction in general, see Articles 173-183. EEC TREATY, supra note
1, arts. 164-188.
237. See Hans Moser v. Land Baden-Wurttemberg, 1984 E.C.R. 2539, [1984] 3
C.M.L.R. 720, 728, 1 20 (1984) ("the provisions of the [EEC] Treaty ... cannot be applied
to situations which are purely an internal concern of a member-State, i.e. which have no
connection with any of the situations envisaged by Community law."); Kremzow, 3
C.M.L.R. at 2646, 19.
238. See EEC TREATY, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
239. See generally Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2637-47.
240. See Opinion 2/94, 2 C.M.L.R. at 291, 1 36.
241. See generally Kremzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2646, 19.
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issue of human rights remains a wholly internal matter.242  In
Kremzow, the ECJ performed the necessary limiting function to ensure
that the scope of its jurisdiction remains manageable and is not pushed
beyond the boundaries established by the EU Treaty, and remains at a
level it can currently maintain.2 43
If the ECJ were to become involved in the human rights arena, it
would not be as effective in interpreting the actual provisions of EU
law. Member States are capable of providing for the enforcement of
both supranational courts' judgments (the ECJ and the ECHR). A
Member State's refusal to enforce the judgment of one court should not
necessarily prompt action by the other. The extent that either court
should begin to enforce judgments of the other raises issues of integra-
tion of the two courts. This subject is beyond the scope of this casenote.
What becomes clear is that human rights in the EU are fundamentally
important, yet the issue begs clarification in order for the EU to become
a truly unified body.
In the wake of the complexities surrounding the Kremzow decision,
it can actually supply a defining statement of the scope of Union law.
Since the ECHR does not provide adequate measures for enforcement of
its decisions, there is currently no remedy for a party when the Member
State refuses to enforce a decision of the ECHR.244 Kremzow, attempt-
ing to confront and challenge this issue, appealed to the ECJ for a
resolution of this highly debated area of European law.24 5 Kremzow
may have intended that his action provoke the ECJ into offering a de-
finitive statement of the relationship between the European Union and
the European Convention, but the ECJ refused revisit a previously ad-
dressed issue.246 Instead, the court maintained its position that separa-
tion of the various European institutions is essential to the proper func-
tion of the Union and refused to expand its already broad jurisdiction.
The ECJ decision in Kremzow exemplifies only one of the many
complexities of European law. Some scholars suggest that perhaps if
they simplified their regional groups Europe could better protect human
rights. 247 Simplification may have lead to a favorable outcome for Mr.
Kremzow, if it was confusion as to each court's role within the Europe
that ultimately led to the non-enforcement of his judgment. However,
242. See id.
243. See EEC TREATY, supra note 1, arts. 164-88.
244. See Jarmul, supra note 45, at 331. See also RALPH BEDDARD, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND EUROPE 22 (1993). Beddard discussed this contradiction by explaining that "[O]ften
applicants have been no better off, except in peace of mind, after applying to the Euro-
pean Commission, although in fact the presence of the Convention and the existence of its
machinery has improved the quality of life of many other European citizens." Id.
245. See Krernzow, 3 C.M.L.R. at 2642-44, 1 12.
246. See generally Opinion 2/94, 2 C.M.L.R. at 265-91.
247. See generally ROBERTSON & MERRILS, supra note 8, at 191.
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this suggests a larger problem that unless there are competent en-
forcement mechanisms available to the ECHR, Member States may
continue to ignore judgments such as in Kremzow.
V. CONCLUSION
It is surprising that in the more than fifty years of the European
Union, there remains no formal declaration of human rights.248 While
human rights are adequately protected in Europe through the Euro-
pean Convention,249 it is important to remember that the ECJ was not
established to protect the human rights of Union members. 250 The
ECHR was created specifically to perform this task, but it is the exact
situation seen in Kremzow that suggests the distinction between these
two supranational courts is not so clear.
In defense of the action taken by the ECJ, the ECJ must clearly de-
fine what issues fall within its jurisdiction, and it is not within its juris-
diction to hear cases concerning human rights. Fortunately for citizens
of the EU, that responsibility falls within the jurisdiction of the ECHR.
If one analyzes this decision as a failure by the EU to protect human
rights, a greater message is lost. That message is that the ECJ contin-
ues to empower the ECHR by deferring to its better judgment concern-
ing human rights issues.
The ECJ already has an enormous jurisdictional base, partially
demonstrated by its recent need to establish a secondary court.25 1
Adding another area to the ECJ's jurisdiction would only make the ECJ
less efficient and less effective in implementing the laws it was created
to enforce. This is additionally supported by the fact that Europe has
established the ECHR. The exclusive purpose of the ECHR is to adjudi-
cate potential human rights violations, and to serve as a model for hu-
man rights protections throughout the rest of the world.
As Europe moves closer to unionization, a reexamination of the
powers and jurisdiction of these two courts are imminent. Many possi-
bilities exist for the status of these supranational courts if full unioniza-
tion is reached, and possibly some degree of integration will result.
While the EU concentrates on the economic aspect of unionization for
the moment, the Council of Europe remains Europe's primary human
rights monitor. The Kremzow opinion is therefore a necessary limita-
248. Sera, supra note 46, at 152. See also EEC TREATY, supra note 1, arts. 1-240.
249. See generally European Convention, supra note 13.
250. While the ECJ defers to the European Convention when issues concerning hu-
man rights arise, the European Convention does not bind them. Sera, supra note 46, at
152.
251. See supra, note 142 and accompanying text (discussing the Court of First In-
stance).
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tion on the ECJ's jurisdiction, rather than a denial of human rights pro-
tection for the citizens of the European Union.

